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A l’occasion du 20ème anniversaire de la chute du mur de Berlin, le magazine américain 
Journal of Democracy a publié une série d’articles de politologues venus des Etats-
Unis et d’Europe. Nous reproduisons ci-dessous la contribution de Jacques Rupnik, 
directeur de recherches au CERI. Après l’enthousiasme des premières années puis les 
réformes politiques et économiques qui ont rapproché les pays d’Europe centrale et 
orientale de leurs voisins occidentaux, tous sont à la recherche d’un « nouveau 
paradigme démocratique », écrit Jacques Rupnik, rendue d’autant plus nécessaire que 
le modèle libéral-démocratique semble en crise.   
  
The twentieth anniversary of the fall of communism, the founding moment for democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe, comes at a time when the term “democratic revolution” evokes 
less a frisson of excitement than a slight twinge of embarrassment in the countries 
concerned. 
In Poland and Hungary, one could attribute this to their experience of transition as a 
peaceful, negotiated affair. Not the celebration of revolution, but rather the complete rejection 
of all revolutionary logic seems to many a Pole and Hungarian to be 1989’s best and truest 
legacy. Not Paris in 1789, but the “Spanish model” of the 1970s was foremost in the minds of 
the Polish and Hungarian roundtable participants who secured their respective countries’ 
unexpectedly smooth exits from totalitarian thralldom. 
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But the consensus ends there. In Poland, the twentieth anniversary of the (nearly) free 
elections of 4 June 1989 was marked by three separate ceremonies held in three different 
cities. One featured President Lech Kaczynski, one was overseen by Premier Donald Tusk, 
and the third was held at parliament in Warsaw. In Hungary, the twentieth anniversary of the 
May 1989 opening of the border with Austria passed with a notable lack of public fervor and 
the conspicuous absence from any observance of the main opposition leader, Viktor Orbán. 
In late June, with the global economic downturn pinching badly, a poll was released 
suggesting that almost half of all young Hungarians thought life under what used to be called 
“goulash communism” was better than life today. 
Even in Berlin, where the fall of the Wall on 9 November 1989 gave the communist collapse 
its iconic moment, the atmosphere was muted in the wake of revelations that Mikhail 
Gorbachev had played a larger role in bringing the Wall down than had previously been 
realized. More seriously, an astonishing poll released in March 2009 found that a majority in 
what had once been East Germany thought that life had been better under the old German 
Democratic Republic (GDR). “Ostalgia” seems to have spread to a new generation that 
remembers the GDR and its one-party communist dictatorship only vaguely, if at all. The 
democratization of East Germany through its 1990 reunification with the West—the least 
painful of all the Eastern bloc transitions—is now seen as a mixed blessing by its greatest 
beneficiaries. 
Looking south to the Czech Republic, we see that the globally resonant “velvet revolution” is 
now spoken of by Czechs with caution and even diffidence. 
Former dissident and deputy Senate chairman Petr Pithart prefers the term “takeover”; the 
actor and Charter 77 signatory Pavel Landovský suggests the “abolition of serfdom”; and the 
media refer modestly to “the events of November 1989” or simply “November.” Interestingly, 
nobody in Prague claims to own the “copyright” on the term “velvet revolution” or can identify 
its author. Václav Havel, that revolution’s most prominent figure, attributes the name to a 
Western journalist. The term, like so much of what followed, seems to have originated in the 
West. 
“Ostalgia” notwithstanding, there is no actual desire in Central and Eastern Europe to return 
to dictatorship. But there is, unmistakably, a “crisis of expectations,” and even a sense of “the 
revolution betrayed” that expresses itself as disenchantment with democracy after two 
decades of experience with it. No one pines for communism to come back, but it is clear that 
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democracy can no longer derive its legitimacy from 1989 and the overwhelming rejection of 
the old regime which that year witnessed. 
Even a cursory overview of recent developments unlikely to make it into Western 
newspapers reveals reasons for the absence of “1989 triumphalism” in the old Warsaw Pact 
countries. The Baltic real-estate bubble has burst, and Latvia in particular is facing social 
unrest for the first time. Hungary and Slovakia (which has a Magyar minority) are involved in 
a simmering war of words and nerves. In Prague, an unelected caretaker government run by 
an ex-communist statistician holds office while fresh elections are delayed due to an intense 
political controversy over a Constitutional Court ruling. 
Anyone who thinks that the prospect of a populist or nationalist challenge to democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe had peaked when the Kaczynski twins held the premiership and 
presidency of Poland at the same time in 2006 and 2007 should now think again. Elections 
remain free and fair, but participation is declining. All the right institutions exist, but on close 
inspection they look like empty shells. There is no alternative to democracy, but there is little 
trust in its institutions, and the political elites that presided over two decades of transition 
seem utterly exhausted. 
One could, of course, dispel such doom and gloom with a mostly positive account of 
democratization in the region that might go something like this: The professed goals of 1989 
were to establish basic freedoms and democratic government, to reach prosperity by using 
the market-based economy as the likeliest road, and to “return to Europe” (which in practice 
meant joining the EU as a community of free nations ensuring peace on the Continent). 
These goals have, on the whole, been achieved—at least across a belt of Central Europe 
stretching from the Baltic states southward to Slovenia. Democracy has no overt challengers; 
elections change governments, not regimes. After an initial slump, the switch to markets 
resulted in a decade of rapid growth and improved living standards for most people. 
Accession to the EU was completed between 2004 and 2007, making Europe’s eastern 
“suburbs” at last part of the continent’s prosperous, democratic mainstream. Things have not 
gone nearly so well in the nearby Balkans or along the periphery of the former Soviet Union, 
where hybrid regimes are still confronting unfinished tasks related to the building of 
independent nation-states and the consolidation of democratic constitutional orders. 
If things have basically gone well and could be much worse (as the less-happy plight of 
nearby countries indicates), why are Central and East Europeans so reluctant to celebrate 
the twentieth anniversary of their region’s escape from communist bondage and the 
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achievements made since then? At bottom, it seems that from one country to the next there 
is an atmosphere of burnout and exhaustion surrounding the transitions to democracy, 
markets, and European integration. 
Early-Onset Democracy Fatigue? 
In the immediate aftermath of 1989, there were expectations that the process of building 
democracy after totalitarianism would be an experiment pregnant with significance for all 
democracies. A process in which all the building blocks of free self-government (constitutions 
and parliaments, civil society and citizenship) would have to be redefined or even reinvented 
drew strong international attention because it was seen as an experiment that might inspire 
some of the tired democracies of the West. What came about instead was the rapid and 
faithful imitation of Western models across Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect, 1989 
differed sharply from 1968, when the idealists of the Prague Spring had harbored the notion 
(or the delusion) that a true “third way”—a model entirely different from both the communist 
system and from Western ways—could be brought about. The great imitation that followed 
1989 was generally successful, at least as far as the constitutional and institutional 
framework was concerned. The only problem was that it involved following a model which 
itself was already showing symptoms of fatigue and even crisis. Having taken on the 
fundamentals of Western democracy, Central and Eastern Europe now seem also to be 
taking on Western democracy’s ills, including steadily dropping rates of political participation, 
a huge gulf between citizens and political elites, low trust in parliamentary and state 
institutions, and the rise of populist and nationalist challengers to liberal democracy. 
Looking back, Václav Havel now says that “we fought for a different political system from the 
one [that] we ended up with.” The disappointments of postrevolutionary life “could to a 
degree have been predicted, but [they] turned out to be much worse than anyone expected.” 
Why then was the “democratic invention” of 1989 so promptly pushed aside? Since it was a 
negotiated transition between moderate communists and dissidents that helped to give birth 
to the new democracies, it may be useful to start the assessment of what happened to the 
democratic hopes of 1989 by examining the worlds of those who were once dissidents and of 
their former opposite numbers, those who had been communists. 
 
 
 
 
Jacques Rupnik - Mélancolie démocratique en Europe… - CERI/Boulevard Extérieur - Janvier 2010 
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org 
 
5 
Too Good to Win? 
Until recently, the transition paradox could be summed up more or less as follows: In 1989, 
the democratic culture of Central and Eastern Europe, in the form of various dissident 
movements, rose up and overwhelmed the decaying political structures by means of which 
communist rulers had been straining to keep democracy in check. Yet once the “game” of 
ordinary parliamentary politics began, the onetime communists, with their superior levels of 
cohesion and experience, outplayed the more democratic but less well-organized former 
dissidents. 
This might be seen as a phenomenon that would predictably set in once the initial, highly 
participatory phase of democratization (which saw voter turnouts topping 90 %) gave way to 
a more routine climate in which professionals such as former communist apparatchiks could 
readily defeat value-oriented amateurs. Parties replaced movements while election 
managers and experts eclipsed dissident intellectuals whose visions of an “antipolitics” 
based on ethics and civil society were ill-suited to the realities of everyday party and 
parliamentary competition. On this reading, the dissidents and the political culture that they 
represented lost because of their virtues—they were, depending on your judgment, illsuited 
or simply “too good” to win. 
Another and more critical view argues that the ex-dissidents became irrelevant precisely 
because they abandoned the dissident legacy: Their actions in 1989 and later provided the 
democratic legitimacy for a free-market experiment that had its rationale but also its political 
constraints and its losers. The “shock therapy” that took place in Poland under the auspices 
of Solidarity’s Lech Walesa and Jacek Kuron succeeded in economic terms but meant 
putting aside the political legacies of and social concerns associated with Solidarity. Those 
most intent on practicing politics in the dissident tradition (emphasizing ethics, rights 
discourse, the rule of law, and civil society) were soon pushed aside. In June 1992, 
Czechoslovakia’s last election before the “velvet divorce” saw the ex-dissident Civic 
Movement fail to reach the 5 percent threshold required for a seat in parliament. In Poland 
and Hungary, electoral formations hewing to the dissident tradition have now met similar 
fates. Both these accounts raise the old question about the status of democratic dissent 
under communism: Were the dissident groups that sprang to prominence in 1989 only the tip 
of a massive democratic iceberg lurking just below the surface of communist-run societies, or 
did the dissidents represent mere pockets of civic virtue within societies that by and large 
had always been rather compliant and passive in the face of communist rule? 
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Beyond the cast-aside legacies of dissent there is also the variety of paths that former 
communist parties have taken. In Central Europe, the communists have become social 
democrats. (Only the Czech Republic has an unreconstructed Communist Party that 
regularly gets more than 10 percent of the vote). In the Balkans, by contrast, the communists 
converted to nationalism: milder in Romania and Bulgaria, more radical in the Yugoslav 
lands, where Slobodan Milosevic brought Adam Michnik’s mordant quip about nationalism 
being “the last stage of communism” to life in an especially horrifying way. 
Unlike their counterparts in the Balkans, the ex-communist parties of Central Europe have 
not acted as major impediments to democratization in their respective countries. They have 
not only endorsed the new democratic system, but have also ardently promoted markets as 
well as membership in NATO and the EU. 
The role that these parties are playing in the current democratic malaise stems less from 
their obvious reluctance to confront the communist past than from their infatuation with the 
state. Under communism, the nomenklatura ruled the state through the party. More recently, 
the nomenklatura has proven itself adept at insider trading and self-dealing during state-
asset privatization. As Anna Grzymala-Busse has argued, where party competition is limited 
so is state capacity, leaving ample opportunities for the spread of political corruption. The ex-
communists in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have been widely associated with the spread 
of such practices. 
Robert D. Putnam has famously argued that social capital—networks built on trust, in other 
words—is a key to fostering civic engagement and a democratic culture. The countries of the 
old Eastern bloc, however, are vexed by the presence of social capital in a perverse form. 
The strongest networks inherited from the past, such as those of the nomenklatura, are 
forces for corruption dedicated to getting around laws and regulations in order to serve their 
members’ selfish interests. The corrosive effect that such groups can have on trust in 
democracy and the rule of law is not hard to imagine. The ex-communists, it seems, have 
gone along with democracy in no small part because they have felt that they could “work it” 
to their advantage, and in doing so have fed the current miasma of democratic 
disenchantment that hangs over the region. There were good reasons why the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe opted for the free-market model as they emerged from state 
socialism. The command economy had been an utter failure, and markets seemed to provide 
the clearest break from it. “No experiments!” and “The ‘third way’ leads to the Third World!” 
were the watchwords of the day as local free marketeers such as Poland’s Leszek 
Balcerowicz endorsed the U.S. economist Jeffrey Sachs’s “shock therapy” approach. This 
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rested on the assumptions that there is only one true model of a free-market economy, and 
that it can be replicated anywhere as long as it is implemented so quickly that legal and 
institutional constraints do not have time to sidetrack it. 
Beyond the ideological commitment to free markets there was the pressure of the 
“Washington consensus,” backed by the IMF and the World Bank, to pursue rapid 
privatization, deregulation, and more open labor markets—all at the same time. The state 
was seen as the enemy of freedom, a legacy of the old regime to be dismantled through the 
joint efforts of political liberals (often ex-dissidents) who wanted to enhance human rights and 
individual freedoms and economic liberals who wanted to enhance the scope of the free 
market. 
The achievements of the market model in Central and Eastern Europe are undeniable. Over 
the last decade, the region’s economies have on average grown twice as fast as those of 
Western Europe. This made the shock of the worldwide 2008 financial and economic crisis 
all that much greater. When you come out of communism, you can hardly imagine that 
capitalism could really fall into crisis—that, after all, had been the worn-out claim of 
communist propaganda. Central and East Europeans built capitalism without much capital of 
their own—most of it came from abroad—and discovered that you cannot insulate yourself 
from larger crises or have “capitalism in one country.” The East’s free marketers had opted 
for the “Anglo-American” model as opposed to the continental one, which they considered 
too heavily regulated and burdened with an overgrown welfare state. Yet since the crisis hit 
the United States and Britain especially hard and forced their respective governments to take 
drastic actions that included nationalizing banks, the “Anglo-American” preference has 
become more difficult to sustain. 
With the state stepping back in to rescue capitalism, post-1989 market liberalism lay 
shattered. Local variations notwithstanding, Central and Eastern Europe’s political and 
economic elites have all had to confront the reality that their chosen model was in crisis. The 
“liberal” moment within the larger process of transition has come to a close. With the boom 
years behind us and free-market ideologues forced to keep a lower profile, there is now room 
for a long-delayed debate about “what kind of capitalism” is best suited for today. Until 
recently, a certain confusion reigned. The cultural left was economically on the right (favoring 
markets) while the cultural right (nationalist conservatives such as the Kaczyñskis in Poland 
and Orbán in Hungary) was economically on the left (statist). Now the “varieties of 
capitalism” question looks as if it may become a salient issue around which future 
realignments in Central and East European politics might take place. 
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The Limits of Europe 
The EU’s effective use of conditionality during the accession process played a key role in 
aiding democratic consolidation across Central and Eastern Europe. Democracy and human 
rights were laid down as absolute requirements, not subject to any negotiation. The EU 
stressed its prospective new members’ willingness and ability to implement the EU legislation 
known as the acquis communautaire. Indeed, the EU insisted so strongly on this that it has 
been charged with having undermined genuine party competition and the parliamentary 
process. There is something to the argument that the EU’s eastward expansion of its single 
market and shared legal norms threatens to empty domestic politics of its substance. Like 
the adoption of democracy and markets, “Europeanization” is also based on imitation. Yet 
there is no denying at the same time that it has done much to promote the stable rule of law. 
In Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, illiberal political elites found that the costs of resisting 
EU integration were too high to pay in domestic electoral as well as economic and diplomatic 
terms. The same logic is now at work in Croatia and even Serbia. 
Now that the “big bang” created by the admission of ten new member states is over, and 
given the travails that the EU has been suffering as it struggles to reform its governance and 
redefine its project, it is widely thought that further enlargement (aside from the entry of 
Croatia) is not on any near-term agenda, and that in any case it is not the only type of 
relationship that the EU can or should develop with its peripheries. The countries of the 
western Balkans—Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia—are 
clearly committed to eventually making the transition from their current status as European 
protectorates to full acceptance as actual EU members. For others (from Ukraine to the 
Caucasus), “neighbourhood policies” or “Eastern partnerships” are all that is on offer, at least 
in the medium term. But can the “transformative power” of the EU be effective in helping the 
democratization of former Soviet republics when EU membership is not a  plausible goal? 
Some commentators in the new member states have written about “membership without 
belonging.” What if formal membership itself becomes less and less likely the farther east 
you go? It now seems clear that for the next twenty years the pattern successfully 
implemented in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 is unlikely to be repeated outside the 
Balkans. EU expansion is reaching its limits and has begun to decline as an influence on the 
region. 
 
 
 
Jacques Rupnik - Mélancolie démocratique en Europe… - CERI/Boulevard Extérieur - Janvier 2010 
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org 
 
9 
The twenty years since 1989 have brought us to the close of a triple cycle. We have seen the 
acute excitement of democratic transition and consolidation give way to symptoms of 
“democracy fatigue” and elite exhaustion. We have seen a successful economic transition 
away from state socialism fall victim to a crisis of the free-market model. And we have looked 
on as the EU’s transformative power has reached its geopolitical limits. The nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe successfully imitated a model that is now in crisis. Like the rest 
of the world, they currently find themselves in search of a new democratic paradigm. 
 
